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Abstract

Literature suggests two distinct paths to stock market development: an approach based
on legal protections for investors, and an approach based on self-regulation of listed
companies by stock exchanges. This paper traces China’s attempts to pursue both
approaches, while focusing on the role of the stock exchanges as regulators. Specifically,
the paper examines a fascinating but unstudied aspect of Chinese securities regulation—
public criticism of listed companies by the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Based on
both event study methodology and extensive interviews of market actors, we find that the
criticisms have significant effects on listed companies and their executives. We evaluate
the role of public criticisms in China’s evolving scheme of securities regulation,
contributing to several strands of research on the role of the media in corporate
governance, the use of shaming sanctions in corporate governance, and the importance
of informal mechanisms in supporting China’s economic growth.

*

Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Chinese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School; and
Fuyo Professor of Law and Director, Center for Japanese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School.
We received excellent research assistance from Bian Hao, Cao Liping, Guo Danli, Li Zhuo, Shen Yun,
Zhou Qianwei, Yang Zhenghong, Zeng Xiangyun, and Li Jiadong. Helpful comments were received from
workshop participants at Columbia Law School, Harvard Law School, Hong Kong University Faculty of
Law, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
All interviewees were promised complete anonymity. We thus cite to interviews based on the year
in which they occurred, but we do not identify other details regarding the interview location or interviewee.

INTRODUCTION

Developing a robust, well regulated securities market is one of China’s biggest
institution-building challenges today. Although the stock market has grown considerably
in size and stature in its short history, by many measures China has considerable distance
to travel before it can claim to possess a truly functional capital market. The creation of a
liquid, transparent and well-regulated securities market will be crucial to the efficient
pricing and allocation of capital and the growth of promising companies in the future. It
is also critical to the sound investment of China’s enormous private savings.
Academic literature suggests two distinct paths to this goal. The law and finance
literature advanced by La Porta et al. (1997) suggests that stock markets grow in the
presence of strong legal protections for investors: “Because a good legal environment
protects the potential financiers against expropriation by entrepreneurs, it raises their
willingness to surrender funds in exchange for securities, and hence expands the scope of
capital markets” (La Porta et al. 1997, p. 1149). Many subsequent studies, including
those focused on developing and transition economies, have advocated high quality statesupplied regulation as the key to healthy stock market development (see, for example,
Johnson et al. 2000).1
A second line of literature focuses on the role of a private actor—the securities
exchange—as the provider of investor protection needed for stock market growth. John
Coffee, for example, argues that well before the passage of the federal securities laws in
the 1930s, the United States enjoyed large and liquid securities markets because the New
York Stock exchange created rules that provided investor protection (Coffee 2001b).
Taking this claim a step further, other scholars have argued that stock exchanges are not
only the first historically, but also the most effective regulators of stock market disclosure
and behavior (Mahoney 1997; Pritchard 1999). The argument is that stock exchanges,
which are typically owned by their members, have strong incentives to adopt rules that
meet the needs of investors. One commentator recommends “countries that are at or
close to square one—those without an established system of securities regulation”-should seriously consider giving “a large portion of regulatory power to securities
exchanges” (Kahan 1997).
China’s unique political and institutional infrastructure makes straightforward
application of either strand of this policy advice difficult. Political obstacles and
weaknesses in basic law enforcement infrastructure constrain the legal approach (Pistor
and Xu 2005). At the same time, China’s two stock exchanges are not independent of the
state and lack significant autonomous regulatory authority, undermining their capacity as
self-regulatory organizations. Notwithstanding these obstacles, China has pursued both
legal enforcement and the self-regulatory function of the stock exchanges as integral parts
1

There is a debate in the literature today about whether public or private enforcement of the securities laws
contributes to more dispersed share ownership, but commentators on both sides emphasize legal protections
as central to stock market development. Compare LaPorta et al. (2006) with Jackson and Roe (2006).

of its capital market developmental strategy. Not surprisingly, the results to date have
been mixed. China’s stock market has grown to be the twelfth largest in the world on the
basis of market capitalization, but it remains underdeveloped in view of China’s
economic heft and potential, and it suffers from serious problems of fraud, poor
disclosure, inefficient pricing, and weak enforcement.
Thus far, the legal approach to stock market regulation in China has received all
of the academic attention (Hutchens 2003). In this paper, we focus on the role of the
stock exchanges as providers of investor protection. We explore a novel but unstudied
form of securities regulation in China—public shaming sanctions imposed on listed
companies by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.2 We have data on public
criticisms of listed companies imposed by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges
from 2001-2006. We combine event study methodology with qualitative assessments of
data and interviews of market participants and regulators to explore the impact of the
sanctions on sanctioned firms and directors.
Our paper is related to several different strands of research. In addition to the
literature, just discussed, on stock market development, the Chinese case contributes to a
small body of literature on the use of shaming sanctions as a corporate governance tool
(Kahan and Posner 1999; Skeel 2001). To date, that literature has focused almost
exclusively on the United States. But the United States, with its relatively efficient stock
market and comparatively robust set of corporate and securities law enforcement
institutions, may not provide the best environment in which to consider the effectiveness
of reputational sanctions on corporate behavior. China, with a comparatively
underdeveloped legal system, may offer a better setting in which to examine the role of
reputational sanctions in corporate governance.3 Indeed, recent research has emphasized
the role of reputational mechanisms in buttressing poorly developed formal governance
institutions to support economic growth in China (Allen, Qian and Qian 2005).
Exploration of the use of stock exchange criticisms in China also contributes to a nascent
literature on the role of the media in corporate governance (Dyck and Zingales 2002;
Dyck, Volchova and Zingales 2006). As we will show, domestic media coverage of the
sanctions of affected firms and individuals serves as an important mechanism of
discipline in the Chinese context. Finally, our research is broadly consistent with an
emerging scholarly view which identifies devolution of authority, regulatory
polycentrism, and experimentation as key features of China’s process of legal institutionbuilding to date.

2

We are aware of only two papers in English that discuss the shaming sanctions. One mentions the
phenomenon in passing, and the other analyzes it empirically as a species of governmental securities
regulation without providing any institutional context or theory for its role in the regulatory framework.
The limited Chinese-language academic literature that mentions exchange sanctions likewise treats
shaming sanctions largely in passing.
3
This speculation is supported by a small literature on norms and corporate law. For example, Bernard
Black (2001) has shown that the market rewards firms that signal willingness to abide by norms of good
corporate governance in Russia, where law and governance standards are weak. Similarly, John Coffee
(2001a) has concluded that “norms may matter most where law is weakest.”

Part 1 sets the stage for our discussion by describing stock market development in
China on a comparative scale, outlining the steps taken thus far to build a regulatory
environment for capital markets in China (including both legal and stock market
approaches), and assessing the limitations of these approaches to date.
Part 2 explores the use of public shaming sanctions by the stock exchanges as a
means of improving corporate governance in China. We present data on public criticisms
of companies and individuals imposed by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges
from 2001 through 2006. We examine the extent to which use of public criticisms
represents a delegation of regulatory authority by the China Securities and Exchange
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to the stock exchanges, and consider the possible
emergence of regulatory competition between the exchanges.
In Part 3, we attempt to discern the effect of the public criticisms from a variety of
different perspectives. We examine the effect of the criticisms on stock price, financing
options, and the reputation of individual executives and the corporation itself. Our
analysis suggests that public criticisms do matter to a variety of constituencies in China.
Moreover, other Chinese regulatory actors have begun using the public criticisms as a
touchstone around which to build complementary monitoring devices for firms. These
findings strongly suggest that stock exchange criticisms, although largely dismissed or
ignored in prior literature on China’s securities markets, have become an important tool
for combating malfeasance in China’s securities markets.
In Part 4, we evaluate the use of shaming sanctions as a regulatory tool in the
Chinese context, and tie the specific experience examined here into a larger picture of
corporate governance reform and legal development in China. The use of shaming
sanctions by the stock exchanges fits a larger (if uneven) pattern of experimentation and
decentralized enforcement that has taken root since China’s economic and legal reform
period began in the late 1970s. Our research is consistent with the findings of other
scholars who have emphasized the use of relational or reputational mechanisms as
informal supports for China’s economic development. Our study, however, provides a
more concrete and contextualized example of a reputational mechanism to support
economic activity than has been provided in the literature to date. We also show that
China’s stock exchanges, despite limitations on their independence from the state, may
emerge as important actors for strengthening oversight over China’s listed companies.
Such controlled devolution of authority may be crucial to continuing to strengthen legal
institutions in China, just as it has proved an important determinant of China’s economic
success to date.

1. CHINA’S STOCK MARKETS: REGULATORY AND DEVELOPMENTAL
STRATEGIES
As noted above, there is now a large body of literature on stock market
development. Generalizing from this literature, we find consensus on several key points:
law matters to stock market development, although we don’t know under precisely what

conditions, or even precisely what constitutes “good” law for this purpose. Moreover,
private initiative, commonly in the form of self regulation of members by the stock
exchanges, but perhaps also on the part of investors themselves, also matters.
In this Part, using these key points of consensus to frame the discussion, we
briefly describe the development of China’s stock markets to date. The picture that
emerges is entirely consistent with the literature: a market that has grown significantly in
a relatively short time under a dual strategy of legal development and self-regulatory
initiative,4 but one whose functions and linkages to the larger economy are still
problematic and shallow, plausibly due to the severe confines within which the dual
strategy has been pursued in the Chinese context.
1.1. Two Snapshots of China’s Stock Markets
China’s present stock exchanges were formally approved and established in late
1990 (Shanghai) and in early 1991 (Shenzhen). Their founding came just over a decade
after the process of economic liberalization began. This context is important in
understanding why the exchanges were established. One major purpose in creating the
exchanges was to tap private savings to fund state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which were
in the process of being restructured (Dam 2006). SOE listings were viewed from a
predominantly developmental perspective—financing local industry, raising fiscal
revenues and fueling the ambitions of local officials (Green 2004, p. 10). Another
rationale was to stimulate investment sentiment among the public (Green 2004, p. 207).
Standard rationales for creating a stock market--financing the most promising investment
opportunities in the economy and facilitating secondary trading of shares--appear to have
ranked relatively low among the government’s list of priorities.
At their inception, the stock exchanges were founded as non-profit membership
organizations. They were supervised by the two local governments with some oversight
by the local branches of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the central bank. The
inconsistency of local regulation and inadequacy of supervision, which generated some
high-profile problems, led to the creation of the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) and greater centralization of authority over the exchanges in 1992. For the next
several years, authority was unevenly distributed among local officials and a variety of
central government agencies, including the CSRC, the PBOC, and the Ministry of
Finance. It was not until 1998 that oversight of the exchanges was centralized in the
CSRC.
Throughout the 1990s the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges competed to attract
new listings (Renmin Wang 2002; Jin 2003; Jinrong Shibao 2006). In September 2000,
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange suspended new listings in order to prepare for the creation
of a board of small and medium enterprises. Reports stated that Shanghai and Shenzhen
had competed for the right to host the new board focused on small, high-growth and hightech companies. Shenzhen prevailed, but only after giving up the right to list larger
4

Or at least what could reasonably pass as self-regulatory initiative under existing political and legal
constraints.

companies (Beijing Qingnian Bao 2000; Nanfang Zhoumo 2006).5 From late September
2000 through May 2004, virtually all new A-share listings in China were on the Shanghai
Stock Exchange.
In May 2004, the CSRC, with approval of China’s State Council, formally
approved the creation of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s Small and Medium Enterprises
Board (SMEB). New listings on the SMEB commenced in June 2004. As of February
2007, a total of 111 companies had listed on the SMEB. In principle, since June 2004 all
small and medium companies have listed in Shenzhen, while larger companies have
listed in Shanghai (Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao 2004).6 While there do not appear to be
fixed thresholds distinguishing the size of listings on the two exchanges, in general,
Shanghai-listed companies tend to be larger, more prominent, and have more connections
to state ownership than those listed in Shenzhen. As of February 2007, there were a total
of 588 companies listed in Shenzhen and 845 listed in Shanghai.
Today, Chinese stock markets look extremely impressive, particularly given their
short history. A snapshot of the current size—as measured by several widely used
metrics -- is provided in Table 1.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

As Table 1 indicates, as of the end of 2005, China’s stock markets were the
twelfth largest in the world by market capitalization, fifteenth largest by total value traded
(a more accurate measure of their true size, given that most shares of public companies in
China are only now becoming tradable as a result of reforms undertaken in 2005 and
2006), and tenth largest by number of listed companies. Table 1 thus lends support to the
conclusion of other observers that China has done well in comparison to other transition
economies in terms of stock market development, at least as measured by these standard
indicators (Pistor & Xu 2005). Nonetheless, the market is still not commensurate with
China’s huge size along many other economic dimensions such as foreign reserves, trade
surplus, private savings, and so on.
But these data may convey a rather misleading picture of the market. The
companies listed on the Chinese stock exchanges are small relative to listed firms in other
markets, even other transition economies such as Mexico and Brazil. For example, China
ranks thirty-second in the world in terms of average size of listed companies.7 Moreover,
the state or state affiliates control about 70% of the companies listed on the Shanghai and
5

Shenzhen also successfully resisted efforts to merge the two exchanges (Dongfang Caijing 2001).
A 2006 report in the China Securities Journal stated that the standard for determining companies to be
listed on the SMEB “is still awaiting clarification,” and that the size of companies listing on the SMEB has
been gradually increasing (Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao 2006). Some new listings in Shenzhen post-2004
have exceeded the size of certain listings in Shanghai during the same period. The general trend, however,
is for smaller companies to list in Shenzhen and for larger companies to list in Shanghai.
7
It is worth noting that China has far fewer listed companies (1384) than the major developed economies
such as the U.S. (5231), or the other large transition economy today, India (4730).
6

Shenzhen stock exchanges, despite the fact that much of the tremendous growth in the
economy has been generated in the private sector, not the state sector.
By other measures, China’s stock market appears considerably more marginal.
For example, the ratio of external capital to GNP is 16% in China (using only the value
traded part of the stock market rather than total market capitalization) versus 40% in a
widely used (“LLSV”) average. As of 2005, bank deposits were about 18 times larger
than stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP (Investment Perspectives 2005).
The ratio of IPOs to population is 0.05 in China versus 1.02 in the LLSV average. As
one group of researchers concludes, “[b]oth the scale and relative importance (compared
with other channels of financing) of China’s external markets are not significant” (Allen,
Qian, and Qian 2005).-

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

China’s stock markets suffer from serious problems that limit their role in the
economy. For example, listed companies in China exhibit low variation (high
synchronicity) in firm-specific stock returns,8 suggesting that the stock market does not
allocate capital efficiently. Researchers conclude, “Russia and China, among all
transition economies with substantial stock markets, have been least successful at
fostering functionally efficient stock markets” (Durnev et al. 2004, p. 623). Chinese
stock markets are also believed to be inefficient in pricing capital (Su 2003). In its short
history, the Chinese stock market has been beset by scandals. In the period 1999 to 2003,
a sharp market decline, there was widespread false accounting and misleading disclosure
among listed firms, and several major scandals, including some of the largest listed
companies in China. Accounting fraud, market manipulation, and poor disclosure were
seen as widespread in the early years of the markets, and remain significant problems
today (Chen 2003).
These problems have worked to limit the number of investors in the market along
with the importance of the stock markets in China’s experiment with capitalism. As one
observer puts it, “[i]n economic terms, the impact of China’s stock market on the real
economy and society as a whole has been marginal, with about 10 million investors.”
(Chen 2003, p. 453). Although the market boomed in 2006-07 and drew in many new
investors, the recent trend appears unrelated to a surge in investor confidence in the
structure of the market. In short, China’s “newly established Shanghai Stock Exchange
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange…are growing in size and volume, but their scale and
importance are still not comparable to other channels of financing, in particular the
banking sector” (Allen, Qian and Qian 2007).
8

Durnev et al. (2004, pp. 593, 595-96) compare the U.S., “a more functionally efficient market,” with
China, “a more functionally inefficient market” where functional efficiency refers to the ability of a stock
market to allocate capital to its highest value uses. Fox et al. (2004) show, in a study of 40 countries, that
China has the second to highest level of stock return synchronicity—a measure of share price accuracy,
with higher levels meaning less accuracy.

Thus, China’s stock market development to date presents a decidedly mixed
picture—it is a large market, but one that does not yet play a meaningful role in pricing
and allocating capital in the Chinese economy, particularly for firms unconnected to the
state. In the next sections, we will see that this mixed picture is precisely the result to be
expected based on China’s uneven pursuit of the strategies suggested by prior research—
the legal approach and the self-regulatory approach.
1.2. The Legal Approach
Given the developmental rationale for the establishment of the exchanges, it is not
surprising that investor protection did not receive much attention in the early years of
China’s stock market. Almost a decade of operation by the stock exchanges passed
before the legal system began to respond in a comprehensive way to investor protection
concerns. A Securities Law was enacted in 1998. The law gave the CSRC clear
regulatory authority over the stock exchanges.9 The law expressly prohibited disclosure
of false information, insider trading and market manipulation, but did not explicitly
permit investor lawsuits. This new legal environment was stress-tested shortly after it
was put in place, when a serious market decline in 2001 brought numerous lawsuits
against listed companies. Initially, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) instructed lower
courts not to hear the suits, no doubt reflecting concerns about institutional competency.
In January 2002, however, the SPC issued a guideline providing that investor suits for
misleading disclosure could be brought, provided the company had been administratively
sanctioned for false disclosure by the CSRC. A subsequent SPC regulation in 2003
permitted suits also in cases where the company had been punished for false or
misleading disclosure by other administrative departments or found liable in a criminal
proceeding. The 2003 regulation also authorized suits where individual company
officials, but not the company, had been administratively sanctioned or convicted of a
crime.
The CSRC uses three primary tools to sanction listed companies. First, for lesser
infractions, the CSRC may issue reprimands called “correction orders,” in which a
company or individual is told to correct certain behavior.10 Crucially, however,
correction orders are not formal administrative sanctions and thus do not make target
companies eligible for civil lawsuits under the SPC ruling discussed above. Second, the
CSRC issues more serious administrative sanctions that may take the form of formal
warnings or fines.11 Fines for companies range from 300,000 to 600,000 yuan
(approximately $40,000-$77,000); individuals are subject to fines ranging from 30,000 to
300,000 yuan ($4,000-$40,000) (2005 Securities Law art. 193). As discussed above,
9

The 2005 Securities Law continues this authority, stating that the CSRC is to “carry out supervision and
administration of the securities market” and is responsible for investigating and punishing any violations of
the securities laws (arts. 178 and 179).
10
The CSRC technically may also issue reprimands referred to as “notices of criticism” (tongbao piping).
However, the CSRC does not appear to have issued any notices of criticism since 2002.
11
In most cases companies or individuals are both fined and warned; in a small number of cases the CSRC
has imposed either only a warning or only a fine.

companies subject to administrative sanctions relating to information disclosure are also
subject to potential civil liability. Third, individuals who commit serious violations may
also be barred from participation in the securities markets and from serving as a senior
manager or director of a listed company (2005 Securities Law art. 233).12
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Table 3 shows the number of administrative sanctions issued by the CSRC from
2001-2006. Several points are noteworthy. First, from one perspective, the number of
sanctions seems rather modest given the ubiquity and severity of the problems with false
accounting, insider trading, and inaccurate disclosure in China’s stock markets. The
institutional and political constraints within which the CSRC operates seem apparent in
these rather small numbers. On the other hand, this regulatory activity must be viewed
within the developing country context, and considered in light of the youth of the
institutions involved. Second, the last row of the table, showing the number of sanctions
for misleading disclosure, is the number of companies that are eligible to be sued by
investors under the SPC’s 2002 and 2003 guidelines.
The difficulties of the legal approach are highlighted by our data. As can be seen
from the last row of the table, during the five-year period eighty-seven companies were
“suit- eligible” under the criteria specified in the SPC guideline. An additional twelve
companies were suit-eligible because they were sanctioned in 2000, and thus came within
the two-year statute of limitations that the SPC established when it first authorized such
suits in 2002. Thus a total of ninety-nine companies have been suit-eligible as a result of
CSRC administrative sanctions. Some additional companies sanctioned by the Ministry
of Finance or held criminally liable in this period were also suit-eligible. Complete data
on these sanctions are unavailable, but lawyers who have represented plaintiffs in such
suits estimate that approximately twenty additional listed companies are suit-eligible as a
result of criminal judgments or Ministry of Finance sanctions. Thus, the total number of
suit-eligible companies appears to be approximately 120. According to our analysis and
to plaintiffs’ lawyers, roughly twenty companies have in fact been sued in this period.13
A sue rate of about seventeen percent may initially strike some readers as high, but recall
that in order to be suit-eligible, a company must have already been administratively or
criminally sanctioned for misleading disclosure. Because the factual finding of
wrongdoing has already been made, in theory recovery should be easy: plaintiffs must
simply show that they were harmed by the fraud, which is determined on the basis of
whether plaintiffs held shares at a certain point. Thus, put differently, although CSRCsanctioned companies would appear to be easy targets for investor lawsuits,
approximately eighty-three percent of the eligible target companies have not been sued.
Interviews with plaintiffs’ attorneys suggest that many suit-eligible firms have not been
12

Further details regarding individuals subject to bans are set forth in the Regulations on Bans on Market
Entry (Zhengquan shichang jinru guiding 2006). Market bans are not technically considered to be
administrative sanctions. In practice, however, individual who are banned are also subject to administrative
sanctions.
13
There is no comprehensive source of data on cases filed. Data on the number of companies sued is based
primarily on review of Chinese media reports, and has been confirmed by conversations with both plaintiffs
lawyers and Supreme People’s Court officials.

sued because the prospect of recovery is simply too small to justify the expense, time and
effort required to bring suit. Doctrinal obstacles and uncertainties, the lack of a class
action mechanism to aggregate claims, local favoritism in the courts, uncertain
enforcement prospects, political pressure, and a lack of assets against which to collect a
judgment from an erstwhile defendant corporation all work to diminish the viability of
the legal system as a means of protecting investors. Only a handful of cases thus far have
resulted in a judgment in favor of plaintiffs; a small number have also settled.
Comprehensive data on such outcomes are not available. One 2006 media report stated
that fourteen cases had resulted in judgments or settlements. Lawyers say that only a few
cases have resulted in court judgments ordering compensation to plaintiffs (Lu 2006).
Many of these judgments and settlements have yet to be enforced, and other cases are
languishing in the courts without any apparent progress toward a judgment.
These problems with the legal approach to investor protection may account for the
fact that China’s stock market is still relatively underdeveloped and insignificant to the
economy as a whole. Research by Franklin Allen and co-authors supports this
conclusion. Comparing China’s investor protections and external financial market
development to those of 49 other countries, they find that China appears in the bottom
left corner of the matrix (weak investor protections and comparatively small capital
market) together with Mexico and Indonesia. Hong Kong and Singapore appear in the
extreme upper right hand corner (strong investor protections and comparatively large
capital markets), with the UK and the US in the same region (Allen, Qian, and Qian
2005, p. 75).
1.3. The Stock Exchanges as Self Regulatory Organizations
As noted in the Introduction, the legal approach to capital market development
does not appear to be the only successful approach, either as a historical matter or from a
theoretical perspective. Stock exchanges may be well placed—perhaps even optimally
situated—to provide investor protections. However, the literature on stock exchanges as
regulators rests on the assumption that the exchanges are private, member-run
organizations, an assumption that does not hold for China. As noted above, although the
Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges were initially organized as member organizations
overseen by their respective local governments, since 1998 they have been under the
direct oversight of the CSRC. The first securities law defined the exchanges as legal
entities without profit motive established by China’s State Council for the purpose of
trading in securities (1998 Securities Law, art. 95). This regulatory re-structuring had
important effects on the self-regulatory authority of the exchanges. The CSRC, not the
exchanges, has the power to appoint and remove major stock exchange personnel,
including the general manager. Until 2006, the CSRC approved the listing of securities
on the exchanges, and effectively retained exclusive authority to de-list firms (1998
Securities Law, arts. 55-56).14 Although the exchanges were legally charged with
supervising information disclosure by listed firms, they lacked formal investigative and
sanctioning power. As one commentator observed, “[t]he paramount influence of the
CSRC’s interventionist role in securities regulation has overshadowed the capacity of
14

Article 57 of the 1998 Securities Law stated that the CSRC could delegate such power to the exchanges.

[China’s] stock exchanges to practice their self-regulatory role as mandated by law” (Shi
2007).
In theory, the 2005 revision of the Securities Law moved the exchanges a step
closer to actually performing a self-regulatory role. Two changes are significant. First,
the law gives the exchanges the power temporarily to suspend trading in securities (2005
Securities Law art. 55) and to de-list companies (2005 Securities Law art. 56).15 Second,
the law now expressly defines China’s stock exchanges as self-regulatory organizations
(2005 Securities Law art. 102).16 Commentators and exchange officials have pointed to
the change as signifying that the exchanges are no longer state entities, and that the
exchanges are moving towards greater autonomy from the CSRC (Finance.sina.com
2005; Xinhua 2005; Zhengquan Shibao 2006; Zhongguo Fugui Wang 2005). In practice,
however, the exchanges continue to be subject to the authority and control of the CSRC,
with senior officials at both exchanges appointed by the CSRC.17
Although the self-regulatory capacity of the two exchanges is a work in progress,
they have been proactive in carving out a role for themselves within the narrow political
and institutional space provided them by the state. Perhaps not surprisingly, few
observers have paid close attention to these efforts, focusing instead on the much higher
profile legal approach pursued by the CSRC and private litigants.18 But as we will see, in
overlooking the enforcement role of the exchanges, observers have missed a novel and
potentially important experiment in capital market regulation through reputational
sanctions. We turn now to an exploration of this experiment.

2. PUBLIC CRITICISMS BY THE STOCK EXCHANGES

15

In addition to specifying certain conditions under which trading may be suspended or a company may be
delisted, the Securities Law also states that the exchange may specify in its listing rules other situations in
which a company may be delisted or have trading suspended. Article 60 of the Securities Law gives the
exchanges the power, under certain circumstances, to temporarily suspend trading in bonds, and article 61
grants the exchanges similar power to delist companies’ bonds. The provisions, however, do not grant
discretion to the exchanges to specify additional conditions leading to suspension of trading in bonds. This
may reflect the fact that China’s bond market is fragmented, with only some forms of bonds being traded
on the stock exchanges.
16
The revised securities law also states that administrative review of decisions to suspend trading or to
delist companies shall be handled by a body established by the exchanges. Thus under article 62 of the
new law stock exchange decisions to delist or suspend trading in shares or bonds are not subject to review
by the CSRC. Prior to the new law, administrative review of decisions to suspend or delist shares was
handled by the CSRC (Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Xingzheng Fuyi Banfa 2003, art.
7).
17
Interview 2006-1; Interview 2006-68. For another example, see Liaowang Dongfang Zhoukan (2005),
reporting on arguments that the law makes no substantive changes to the division of authority between the
CSRC and the exchanges, in significant part because the CSRC continues to select the exchanges’ senior
officials.
18
Interestingly, the most extensive treatment of the public criticisms in the English-language literature
treats them as indistinguishable from CSRC (government) sanctions, rather than as a self-regulatory
initiative of the exchanges (Chen et al. 2005).

The stock exchanges have four primary regulatory tools at their disposal. In
ascending order of severity, they are oral warnings, letters of oversight and supervision,
notices of criticisms, and the focus of this article -- public criticisms.19 In addition, the
stock exchanges may deem individuals to be unsuitable to serve as senior managers or
directors of listed companies; the exchanges may also order companies to remove their
company secretaries.20 Only public criticisms and declarations of unsuitability for office
or orders to remove secretaries are made public; the less severe sanctions are considered
to be non-public “internal oversight measures.”21
The use of public criticisms as a regulatory device by the Chinese exchanges is an
example of extended institutional borrowing. The practice of publicly censuring listed
firms and directors originated in the London Stock Exchange. It was extended in the
Financial Services and Markets Act, under which the FSA may publicly censure any
director knowingly involved in a breach of the stock exchange listing rules. The censure
provisions supplement more formal penalties that may be imposed for violation of the
listing rules and Companies Act. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange borrowed the practice
of issuing public criticisms from the London Stock Exchange. The two Chinese stock
exchanges, in turn, modeled their practice on Hong Kong. The effect of public criticisms
as regulatory devices in London and Hong Kong has not been systematically examined.
Some scholars, however, have argued that the use of criticisms by the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange has contributed to comparatively low levels of private benefits of control
among Hong Kong-listed firms (Dyck and Zingales 2001; Dyck and Zingales 2002).
Although the listing rules of both exchanges make clear that violations may
subject companies to internal or public sanctions, the conduct that will result in each type
19

We translate the Chinese term for the sanctions, gongkai qianze, as “public criticism.” Other writers in
English have translated the term as either “public censure” or “public condemnation.” Although “public
censure” is perhaps a more literal translation of the Chinese, we use “public criticism” because it more
effectively conveys the intended reputational effects of such sanctions. The exchanges only started issuing
public criticisms in 1999 (Wu 2005).
20
Warnings are generally issued for only minor infractions. Oversight Letters are slightly more serious, but
are still relatively minor notices to companies that appear primarily designed to elicit further information
from companies regarding unusual arrangements or activities. Notices of criticism are more serious, and
are one step short of a public criticism. Of these lesser forms of oversight measures, Letters of Oversight
are by far the most common: the Shanghai stock exchange issued 716 such letters in 2006, although in prior
years the highest total number of such letters was 153. The number of oral warnings and non-public
notices of criticism issued by each of the two exchanges has generally been a few dozen per year.
21
Notices of criticism, or tongbao piping, the second most serious step the exchanges take against listed
companies, are generally not made public. In some cases, however, the exchanges have made such notices
public, or companies have disclosed the fact that they have received notices of criticism. News reports also
from time-to-time carry details of such non-public sanctions. Interview 2006-77.
In addition, although Notices of Criticism from the Shanghai Stock Exchange are distributed only
to the company or individuals being criticized, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange distributes Notices of
Criticism to all listed companies. Interview 2006-68. The rationale for informing other companies appears
to be that doing so will help the overall functioning of the market by informing all companies of the types
of conduct that are being punished. Exchange officials defend the practice of notifying other companies
but not the public on the grounds that they are a self-regulatory organization, and are simply making other
members of the exchange aware of the misconduct. They also contend that such conduct is not generally so
serious as to be of interest to investors.

of sanction is not made public. The listing rules, which were first adopted in 1998 and
revised repeatedly thereafter,22 contain only vague language regarding the circumstances
in which the exchanges may issue public or internal sanctions against listed companies.
In general, the listing rules state that the exchanges may issue non-pubic or public
sanctions against listed companies depending on whether the offending conduct is minor
or serious. Similarly, the listing rules state that the exchanges may deem an individual
unfit to serve as a director, supervisor, or senior manager of a listed company, but provide
no details as to the conduct that will result in such a determination.
The lack of detail in the listing rules leaves extensive discretion in the hands of
the exchanges in determining whether companies should be subject to public criticisms or
other measures. The Shenzhen Exchange has taken some steps to establish clearer
standards. Thus, for example, in 2005 the Shenzhen Exchange issued the Guidelines for
Directors of Listed Companies, which specify circumstances where an individual may be
deemed unsuitable to continue to serve as a director. These include having been subject
to two public criticisms or three notices and criticisms within the prior three years (art.
41).23 The Shenzhen exchange also maintains internal, non-public standards that
determine whether particular conduct will result in a public criticism or a lesser form of
reprimand. The standards specify certain types of misconduct that will automatically
give rise to a public criticism.24 For other forms of misconduct, including failure to
disclose certain related-party transactions or failure to disclose loans or loan guarantees,
the exchange’s standards look to whether or not the value of the transaction equaled a
specified percentage of the company’s registered capital or net assets.25 Exchange
officials state that their decision not to make the standards public is due to the fact that
the Chinese market “is not sophisticated;” officials are concerned that if companies were
aware of the specific standards, they might manipulate their disclosure so as to avoid
sanctions.26 Exchange officials note that in most cases companies are required to
disclose transactions that fall below the percentage thresholds as well as those that exceed
the thresholds – only the sanction, not the disclosure obligation, turns on the size of the
undisclosed transaction.27
22

The Shanghai and Shenzhen listing rules were identical in their substantive provisions from 2001 to 2006
– reflecting the fact that the rules are drafted in consultation with, and are approved by, the CSRC. The
repeated revisions to the listing rules have tended to strengthen the exchanges’ oversight powers by adding
more specific requirements regarding disclosure obligations and greater emphasis on making disclosed
information available to investors. In addition, various revisions have emphasized the exchanges’ selfregulatory authority, and have sought to separate the exchanges from the CSRC. For example, earlier
versions of the Listing Rules had stated that the exchanges could refer serious cases of misconduct to the
CSRC; such language was omitted in revisions made in 2005. Earlier versions of the listing rules permitted
the exchanges to issue fines. In practice, however, they rarely, if ever, did so.
23
Other circumstances giving rise to a ban on serving as a director include a finding that the individual has
insufficient time to dedicate to company business, being subject to two public criticisms from the CSRC
within three years, serious dereliction of duty or misuse of position, or causing serious harm to the
company or the interests of public shareholders. The Shanghai Stock Exchange does not appear to have
adopted similar rules.
24
Interview 2007-1.
25
Interview 2007-1; Interview 2007-5; Interview 2007-7.
26
Interview 2007-5.
27
Interview 2007-5. Officials also state that from time to time they may adjust the standards, and that
making specific thresholds public might make such adjustments more difficult.

In interviews, Shanghai officials did not mention the existence of standards
similar to those in Shenzhen. Indeed, some exchange officials note and complain about
the lack of clear provisions governing the conditions under which companies may be
sanctioned.28 The extensive discretion vested in the hands of the exchanges in making
determinations between serious and lesser misconduct may allow the exchanges
flexibility in combating new forms of misconduct. But such discretion also suggests that
other considerations, including external pressure, may play a role in determining whether
a company receives a public criticism of a lesser form of reprimand.29

2.1. Data on Public Criticisms
Table 4 sets forth the number of public criticisms issued by both exchanges from
2001-2006. As the Table shows, the Shanghai Stock Exchange issued a total of 109
Public Criticisms between 2001 and 2006. The exchange issued sanctions against 89
different companies. Sixteen companies received two Public Criticisms; one company
received three.30 In addition, eight companies that received Public Criticisms (including
three that were criticized twice) were subsequently delisted from the exchange, although
not necessarily for the same conduct. During the same period, the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange issued 149 public criticisms, against 116 different companies. One company
was publicly criticized four times; three were publicly criticized three times; and twenty
were publicly criticized twice. Eleven of the companies that received public criticisms
were subsequently delisted, including one that had been criticized three times and one
that had been criticized twice.

INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

Sanctions are issued by the exchanges for six different reasons: false or
materially misleading disclosure, inaccurate or late profit forecasts, failure to make
timely disclosure of major corporate matters, failure to undertake approval procedures for
related-party transactions, failure to issue periodic reports on time, and failure to carry
out other legal obligations. Both exchanges issue the most criticisms for failure to make
timely disclosure of major corporate matters (thirty-four percent of the total criticisms
28

Interview 2006-72.
It is procedurally easier for the exchanges to issue lesser sanctions than more serious ones. In Shanghai,
for example, individual departments within the exchange may issue Oral Warnings and Oversight Letters
without approval of senior stock exchange officials outside their departments. Most are issued by the
Listed Companies Department. Interview 2006-68. Both notices of criticism and public criticisms are
prepared by individual departments, generally the listed companies division, but then must be approved by
the Stock Exchange Council, which includes directors of the exchange and also department heads from the
exchange. Interview 2006-68.
30
Multiple sanctions against a single company reflect multiple instances of misconduct. The exchanges do
not criticize a company twice for the same conduct, although companies frequently have multiple problems
– and uncovering one problem may lead the exchanges to discover others. Interview 2007-4.
29

issued by Shanghai; thirty percent of the total for Shenzhen).31 About twenty percent of
the criticisms at both exchanges are issued for failure to make timely amendments to
profit forecasts or for frequent changes to forecasts. Exchange officials noted a trend
toward putting more emphasis on disclosure in recent years, in particular information
relating to loans and loan guarantees issued in the past.32
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE

In the majority of cases in which the exchanges sanctioned listed companies, they
also sanctioned individuals.33 Between 2001 and 2006, the Shanghai Stock Exchange
sanctioned 782 individuals; the Shenzhen Stock Exchange publicly criticized 876
individuals. In a small number of cases the exchanges acted against only individuals, not
listed companies. Shanghai issued three sanction decisions against individuals only,
covering six individuals. Shenzhen issued ten public criticisms against individuals only.

INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
As Table 6 shows, executive directors were the most frequent target of sanctions,
followed by supervisors.34 Independent directors were targeted for sanction far less
31

The following table lists the frequency with which various types of criticisms are issued by the
exchanges. Many sanctions punish companies for multiple cases of misconduct. In such cases, the table
counts a reason as a percentage of the total number of reasons given for the criticism (e.g., a company that
is sanctioned for false disclosure and for failure to issue scheduled reports on time is counted as .5 in each
category). Thus the total number of companies sanctioned for each category of wrongdoing is in fact
higher than indicated in the table below:
Reason for Sanction
1. False Information Disclosure or
seriously misleading statements
2. Profit forecast not accurate or not timely
(generally failure to amend forecasts in
cases of significant discrepancy or frequent
changes to predictions)
3. Failure to timely disclose major
corporate matters
4. Failure to carry out approval procedures
for related-party transactions
5. Failure to issue scheduled reports on
time
6. Failure to carry out other legallyrequired obligations
Total

32

Shanghai

Shenzhen

7+2/3 (7.30%)

12+1/12 (8.11%)

21+1/3 (19.57%)

30+1/4 (20.30%)

37 (33.94%)

44+3/4 (30.03%)

17 (15.60%)

24+5/12 (16.39 %)

23 (21.10%)

26 (17.45%)

3 (2.75%)

11+1/2 (7.72%)

109

149

Interview 2007-29.
Forty of the sanctions in Shenzhen were against only companies and not individuals; fifty five Shanghai
sanctions involved only companies.
34
Chinese company law provides for a German-inspired supervisory board as well as a board of directors.
Most commentators are critical of the corporate governance role actually performed by the supervisory
board in Chinese corporations. For example, see Xi (2006).
33

often, although this appears to be an artifact of the relative newness of the institution.
Most companies in China have only recently added independent directors to their boards.
In fact, the exchanges appear to be increasingly scrutinizing the roles of independent
directors: of the forty Shenzhen Stock exchange sanctions against independent directors,
ten were in 2005 and twenty-eight were in 2006.
More severe than issuing a public criticism against an individual is a stock
exchange determination that an individual is unfit to serve as a director, supervisor, or
senior manager. The exchanges have used this power sparingly. The Shanghai Stock
Exchange has declared fifteen individuals to be unfit for service, including ten in
November 2006 alone. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange has made only one such
determination.35 Shanghai’s dramatic surge in the use of this sanction in late 2006 may
signal a policy of making greater use of this regulatory weapon, although it is too early to
be certain.
2.2. Delegating Enforcement?
What is the relationship between the respective regulatory efforts by the stock
exchanges and the CSRC? The public criticisms issued by the exchanges largely
complement, rather than duplicate, regulatory efforts by the CSRC. Some level of
coordination of regulatory activity between the CSRC and the exchanges is apparent, but
the exchanges also seem to be operating with a degree of autonomy. The motivations for
exchange autonomy, however, are ambiguous.
In most cases, exchange sanctions are separate from and do not lead to CSRC
punishment. Only twenty-six of the eighty-nine companies sanctioned by the Shanghai
exchange were also subject to CSRC administrative punishments, of which only ten cases
involved the same or related conduct. The same tendency is evident in Shenzhen.
Twenty-seven companies were sanctioned by both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the
CSRC, of which only seventeen cases involved the same or related conduct. The lack of
overlap in part reflects the fact that many of the exchange sanctions are for conduct that is
not serious enough to lead to CSRC action.36 Moreover, the exchanges sometimes do not
criticize a company if it has been or will be sanctioned by the CSRC for the same
conduct.37
The exchanges are not required to notify the CSRC of decisions to criticize
companies prior to doing so, and in most cases the exchanges do not consult with the

35

In contrast, during the same period the CSRC issued market bans, ranging from three years to life,
against eighty-two individuals. CSRC regulations specify that the CSRC may ban individuals found to
have committed serious breaches of the law or administrative regulations from participation in China’s
securities market for periods ranging from three years to life (Zhengquan shichang jinru guiding 2006). In
contrast to CSRC market bans, exchange declarations of unfitness to serve have no time limit.
36
Similarly, oversight letters and oral warnings generally relate to violations of exchange rules, and rarely
involve overlap with CSRC regulations. Interview 2006-68.
37
Interview 2006-68.

CSRC prior to taking action.38 In serious cases, however, the exchanges confer with the
CSRC prior to taking action. 39 The exchanges do inform the CSRC of both public
criticisms and of the non-public notice and criticisms after they are issued.40
Exchange officials argue that they are largely autonomous in their decisions to
sanction, but in practice the relationship may be somewhat more complex. In some
cases, the exchanges coordinate their activities with the CSRC. 41 Sometimes misconduct
first comes to light through exchange criticism; the CSRC then follows up and eventually
decides to sanction the companies.42 In others, misconduct is first uncovered by the local
branch office of the CSRC and then reported to the exchanges for sanction. In sensitive
cases, the CSRC may instruct the exchanges not to get involved.43 Despite the theoretical
independence of the exchanges from the CSRC under the new securities law, in practice
the exchanges’ roles continue to be both coordinated with and subject to oversight from
the CSRC.
As a matter of regulatory strategy, exchange sanctions have some significant
advantages over CSRC actions: the exchanges generally take action within a few months
against companies that violate the listing rules; sometimes they act within a few days of
discovering misconduct.44 By contrast, it is common for CSRC punishments to be issued
two or more years after the wrongdoing occurred. 45 Yet some argue that the CSRC is
encouraging a greater role for the exchanges in overseeing listed companies in order to
reduce its own role.46 According to such arguments, the CSRC is overworked; it also
often comes under extensive external pressure not to take actions against listed
companies. Encouraging the stock exchanges to play a greater role may deflect some of
the pressure. Some lawyers argue that encouraging the exchanges to play a greater role
also allows companies to be sanctioned without incurring the risk of civil litigation, as
exchange sanctions cannot serve as a basis for civil suits brought by shareholders. This
view is not uniformly held, however, in particular because civil liability is not yet a major
concern for most listed companies.
Data for the years 2001 to 2006 reported in Table 4 suggest that the frequency
with which the exchanges impose public criticisms has fluctuated from year to year,
generally ranging from ten to twenty-five a year. Officials with both the Shanghai and
Shenzhen exchanges, however, state that in recent years both exchanges have moved
toward stricter standards governing public criticisms, and stricter application of their
38

Interview 2007-1. As noted above, prior to 2005 the listing rules explicitly stated that the exchanges
could refer serious cases to the CSRC.
39
Interview 2006-7.
40
Interview 2007-5.
41
Interview 2006-72.
42
Interview 2006-7; Interview 2007-6.
43
Interview 2006-68.
44
Exchange officials state that it is rare for more than six months to elapse from the time the exchange
uncovers wrongdoing to the time they issue a sanction, and that they frequently issue public criticisms
within one or two months. Interview 2007-5.
45
The CSRC is perceived as moving slowly in its sanctioning activity. Interview 2007-5.
46
Interview 2006-61; Interview 2007-35.

rules.47 Officials comment that the exchanges and the market are placing greater
attention on sanctions.48 This reflects a general trend in the PRC capital markets:
regulators and investors alike are paying more attention to the fundamentals of corporate
governance.49 Exchange officials state that in recent years companies are clearly taking
the risk of being sanctioned far more seriously than they did in the past.50
Table 4, viewed in tandem with Table 3, does not reveal any obvious trend toward
reduced CSRC oversight in favor of the exchanges. The CSRC issued a total of 199
sanction decisions between 2001 and 2006, with a high of 49 in 2004 and a low of 17 in
2002. Of these, a total of 87 sanctions related to disclosure problems, with a high of 27
in 2004 and a low of 6 in 2002. The data, however, do make clear that the CSRC is
targeting only a small percentage of the companies and individuals publicly criticized by
the exchanges, suggesting that the public criticisms are complementing CSRC
enforcement.
In conclusion, the CSRC seems to be encouraging the exchanges to play a greater
enforcement role,51 but the reasons for doing so are ambiguous. It may be part of a
regulatory strategy to maximize sanctioning capacity and improve compliance with
disclosure obligations, by granting greater autonomy to the exchanges. An increased role
for the exchanges may also reflect the real difficulties the CSRC faces in its attempt to
address the myriad of problems in China’s securities markets: the CSRC may not be able
to tackle all disclosure issues, even if wanted to do so. But it may also be motivated by
the desire to insulate the CSRC from political influence by companies seeking to block
the imposition of administrative punishments.52
2.3. Regulatory Competition?
Whatever the larger forces driving the use of public criticisms by the exchanges,
the data suggest that Shanghai and Shenzhen do not utilize this form of self-regulation to
the same extent. Shenzhen has issued more sanctions than Shanghai, despite having
significantly fewer listed companies. In fact, as a percentage of listed firms, in any given
year and over the six year period, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange has issued about twice as
many public criticisms as the Shanghai Stock Exchange.53
The frequency with which public criticisms are issued by the two exchanges may
simply be endogenous to the firms listed on the exchanges. Shenzhen lists comparatively
smaller firms than Shanghai, and small firms are more likely than large firms to be
47

Interview 2006-63; Interview 2007-1; Interview 2007-6.
Interview 2007-5.
49
Interview 2007-35.
50
Interview 2007-1.
51
Interview 2007-1.
52
Interview 2007-1; Interview 2007-6.
53
Shenzhen criticizes from 3% to 6% of listed firms in a given year, and total criticisms equal 28% of the
average number of listed firms over the six-year period. Shanghai has consistently criticized about 2% of
listed firms in a given year, and total criticisms constitute 14% of the average number of listed firms over
the six-year period.
48

sanctioned for fraud by the CSRC and stock exchanges (Chen et al. 2005). This could be
because smaller firms may have weaker governance practices than the larger firms,
resulting in the issuance of more sanctions. Shanghai Stock Exchange officials
(unsurprisingly) offer this explanation.54 Alternatively, larger firms may be more
politically insulated from criticism than smaller firms. Unsurprisingly, Shenzhen stock
exchange officials favor this explanation.55 Data from CSRC sanctions provides some
support for the Shanghai argument: during the period under study, the CSRC issued
administrative sanctions stemming from false or misleading disclosure against forty-three
Shenzhen-listed companies versus forty Shanghai-listed firms, despite the fact that far
more companies are listed in Shanghai.56 As we discuss further below, both exchanges
sanction private companies more often than state-owned companies, despite private
companies making up a minority of all listed firms. This fact, however, can support
either view: private firms may be less connected than state-owned firms, but it also may
be the case that on balance private firms tend to have weaker governance than stateowned public companies.
But the difference may also represent different regulatory strategies by the two
exchanges, reflecting the competitive positions of the two organizations. The Shenzhen
Stock Exchange has long been regarded as the weaker sibling of the Shanghai Exchange.
Although the two exchanges do not compete directly for listings in most cases, in a larger
sense both exchanges are competing with Hong Kong and Singapore for listings,
particularly over the long-term. The Shenzhen Exchange’s more aggressive regulatory
approach may be part of an attempt to distinguish itself from the Shanghai Stock
Exchange, and to close the distance between it and its rival. Observers not affiliated with
either exchange argue that the Shenzhen Exchange is more aggressive in policing its
companies than its counterpart in Shanghai.57 Indeed, Shenzhen Exchange officials
assert that they have tried to become stricter in their oversight of listed companies to
generate greater confidence in the market.58 The stricter standards in Shenzhen are
reflected not only in the numbers of sanctions issued, but also in the clearer standards that
apply (at least internally) for deciding to issue public criticisms, and in the stricter
standards governing directors that apply to companies on the SMEB.59
The Shenzhen Exchange’s strategy of stricter enforcement is not universally
viewed as positive for the development of China’s securities markets given current
institutional realities. Some market actors claim that strict enforcement of rules is
counterproductive and unrealistic at this stage of China’s development. Regulatory
flexibility, the argument goes, is better suited to current market conditions.60 The
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Interview 2006-68.
Interview 2007-5; Interview 2007-7; Interview 2007-35. Some Shenzhen officials do, however, also
accept that large state-owned companies, which predominate in Shanghai, may also have stronger corporate
governance practices than many of the small private companies listed in Shenzhen.
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The total is 83, not the 87 reported in Table 3, because four sanctions reported there were against
individuals only.
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Interview 2006-7; Interview 2007-35.
58
Interview 2007-1; Interview 2007-5.
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See infra.
60
Interview 2007-30.
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Shanghai Stock Exchange is widely perceived as more flexible, easier to communicate
with, and more willing to negotiate to resolve problems than the Shenzhen Exchange.61
The Shenzhen Exchange is perceived as more rule- and disclosure-oriented. 62 As one
lawyer argued, “Shanghai has a more practical appraisal of reality.”63
Regardless of which self-regulatory strategy is better suited to development of
China’s stock markets, the available evidence suggests that the two stock exchanges,
despite their limited room for autonomous action, are pursuing somewhat different paths
toward that goal. Indeed, the fact that the exchanges are competing with each other at all
suggests that the exchanges have become more autonomous, at least as compared to the
recent past. Such trends also support the impression that the regulatory roles of the
exchanges reflect a conscious effort by the CSRC not only to delegate authority, but also
to encourage experimentation and innovation. Even subtle competition may be a means
of fostering multiple approaches to enforcement.

3. EFFECTS
The discussion to this point raises an obvious question: should we care? The role
of stock exchange criticisms in the development of China’s capital markets depends upon
their effectiveness. In this part of the paper, we try to assess their effect on a range of
market actors—investors, creditors, directors and other corporate officials, and the
corporate entity itself. We acknowledge the inherent difficulty of this task, and concede
the necessarily impressionistic nature of our some of our analysis. However, the
discussion that follows is based on both widely used event study methodology and
extensive interviews of market participants in China. A remarkably consistent picture
emerges from our research: the public criticisms matter, and they are taking on greater
importance in the regulatory scheme.
One measure of the effects of public criticisms is the degree to which company
officials try to persuade the exchanges not to issue them. Exchange officials state that
they are frequently subject to pressure from companies not to issue sanctions.64 Prior to
issuing a public criticism, the exchanges inform the target companies of their decision
and permit the companies to reply within a specified period.65 However, there are no
procedures governing how responses are to be handled. 66 Sometimes companies and
61

Interview 2007-29.
Interview 2007-29; Interview 2007-30; Interview 2007-34.
63
Interview 2007-34. The lawyer gave the example of disclosure requirements regarding related party
transactions, whereby companies are required to disclose transactions beyond a certain size. As the lawyer
explained, one company he represents engaged in transactions that exceed this threshold every day, thus in
principle requiring disclosure of each. He asserted that the Shanghai Exchange would understand if the
company failed to disclose each individual transaction, which the Shenzhen Exchange “would just sanction
you.” Interview 2007-34.
64
Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-69; Interview 2007-1.
65
Interview 2006-72; Interview 2007-5.
66
Interview 2006-68.
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individuals try to persuade the relevant departments at the exchanges not to issue
criticisms; in other cases they seek to influence the leaders of the exchanges. 67
Companies occasionally use lawyers and legal arguments to lay out a defense, but much
more commonly they rely on relationships and in-person discussions to persuade senior
officials at the exchanges or the CSRC.68
Efforts to persuade the exchanges not to issue public criticisms are sometimes
successful. In 2005, the Shanghai Exchange issued public criticisms against eighteen
companies. In approximately ten additional cases, however, the exchange dropped
proceedings against companies after the initial notification that it intended to publicly
criticize them.69 (Figures regarding Shenzhen were not available.) Although officials
claim they rarely change a decision after an initial determination,70 they acknowledge an
occasional change in response to lobbying efforts. Most often this takes the form of not
targeting particular directors for public criticism.71 Shenzhen officials noted that they
have attempted to insulate themselves from such pressure by creating clear internal
standards specifying when sanctions shall be issued, and by vesting the decision to issue
a sanction in a committee made up of officials from a variety of departments – and not
only with the leaders of the exchange.72 In Shanghai, by contrast, exchange leaders make
the final decision regarding sanctions. At present, there is no mechanism for appealing
exchange sanctions. However, both the Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges are now
discussing creating a committee consisting of exchange officials and members from
outside the exchanges that would serve as an appeals body for public criticisms.73
It is, of course, difficult to discern whether the exchanges drop cases due to
convincing legal and technical arguments or as a result of other forms of influence.
Either form of persuasion is likely to be effective in a given case.74 One perception is
that Shanghai Stock Exchange officials are more susceptible to relational influences due
to the larger number of high-profile state-owned companies listed there.75 Regardless of
the type or effectiveness of lobbying, the frequency and intensity of individual and
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Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-72; Interview 2007-1.
Interview 2006-70. Lawyers, exchange officials and company managers say that it is rare for companies
to involve lawyers in such negotiations. Interview 2007-5; Interview 2007-29; Interview 2007-34. Doing
so, said one CEO, would simply make matters more tense. Interview 2007-29. Exchange officials say that
they are unlikely to be influenced by non-legal arguments – but also acknowledge that they sometimes
cannot avoid other forms of pressure. Interview 2006-72. One CEO said that companies facing sanction
will first seek to argue their case with lower-ranking officials on the merits, but will not hesitate to seek out
more senior officials if necessary to avoid being sanctioned. Interview 2007-29.
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Interview 2006-68.
70
Interview 2007-5.
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This is particularly the case when individuals can show that they objected to the decision or action that
resulted in the sanction. Interview 2007-5. Officials also said that in some cases companies provide
additional facts that persuade the exchange that the initial infraction was not as serious as first
contemplated. Id.
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Interview 2007-5. Senior officials of the exchange participate in the committee, and thus may exert some
influence on committee votes, but they formally only have individual votes in committee discussions.
Interview 2007-1; Interview 2007-5.
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Interview 2007-7.
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Interview 2006-71; Interview 2007-1.
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Interview 2007-1.
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corporate efforts to persuade the exchanges to drop the sanctions is compelling evidence
that the targets of public criticisms take them seriously.
3.1. Share Price Effects
We attempted to measure stock market reaction to the public criticisms. Using
standard event study methodology,76 we measured stock price effects of the first public
announcement of the public criticism by a stock exchange, typically by publication in one
of China’s three major securities industry newspapers. We measured the cumulative
effects on the securities of all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges
subjected to public criticism for the most serious categories of misconduct, including
failure to disclose material information and failure to conduct related-party transactions
according to required procedures, over the period 2001 to 2006.77 Publication of the
criticisms resulted in negative and significant abnormal returns for both the Shanghai and
Shenzhen exchanges in all specifications of the data but one.78
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In a stock market event study, cumulative average returns (CARs) are estimated by summing estimated
abnormal returns over an event window. We use the market model to calculate abnormal stock returns. For
the Shanghai Stock Exchange, we used the A Share Index to control for the effect of market-related
variation on a given stock return. For the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we used the A Share Index.
We examined two event windows: a 3-day event window [-1,1] and a 5-day event window [-2,2]. The
estimation window dates from -250 to -7 for the 3-day event window and from -250 to -8 for the 5-day
event window.
The cumulative abnormal return from day τ 1 to day τ 2 ( CAR (τ 1 ,τ 2 ) )is calculated as:
τ2

CAR(τ 1 ,τ 2 ) = ∑ ARτ , sum of sample-average abnormal returns through the event window [τ 1 ,τ 2 ] , in
τ =τ1

which ARτ represents the sample-average abnormal returns on the dayτ (τ 1 ≤ τ ≤ τ 2 ) .
N

ARτ =

∑ AR τ
i,

i =1

N

Where,
ARi ,τ : company-specific abnormal return of stock i at time
N : number of stocks in the sample

τ

In the market model, ARi ,τ is calculated as ARi ,τ = Ri ,τ − αˆ i − βˆi ( Rm ,τ ) . where Ri ,τ is the actual stock
return of company i at time

τ

and Rm ,τ is the market return at time τ . The parameters αˆ i and βˆi are

estimated from the market model

Ri ,τ = α i + βi Rm,τ + ε i ,τ
E (ε i ,τ ) = 0

77

var(ε i ,τ ) = σ ε2i

We excluded from the sample firms for which complete data were unavailable, firms that were delisted,
and where share trading had been suspended or otherwise displayed erratic and unexplained price
movements. The sample was comprised of 68 observations for the Shanghai exchange and 98 observations
for the Shenzhen exchange.
78
Negative abnormal returns on the Shenzhen exchange were only marginally significant using a five-day
event window.

We also measured the stock market reaction to the first company disclosure of the
underlying misconduct that eventually resulted in the public criticism. Company
disclosure resulted in significant negative abnormal returns for both exchanges in all
specifications.79 Since the company disclosure occurred, on average, 45.8 days prior to
the Shanghai Stock exchange criticisms and 66.5 days prior to the Shenzhen criticisms, it
is fair to assume that some of the disclosures were prompted by the threat of criticism.80
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
Thus, our findings suggest that the stock exchange criticisms prompt disclosure of
information that the market finds meaningful. Moreover, the market reaction to the stock
exchange criticism itself suggests that, even after the underlying corporate information
has been disclosed, the public criticism leveled by the stock exchange is itself deemed to
be a significant event by investors. Investors appear to care about the public criticisms.
Our findings are generally consistent with prior studies, though most findings are
not directly comparable to our own. The only prior English-language study on stock
price effects of criticisms found negative and significant abnormal returns to public
criticisms issued between 1999-2003 (Chen et al. 2005)81 The findings of Chineselanguage studies are mixed, though most find a significant effect.82 Some scholars find
that exchange sanctions have a greater effect on share price than do CSRC sanctions –
although they explain this finding by noting that the market is more likely to be aware in
advance of CSRC investigations than of exchange sanctions.83 Other studies find that
79

We again excluded from the sample firms for which complete data were unavailable, firms that were
delisted, where share trading had been suspended or otherwise displayed erratic and unexplained price
movements. The sample was comprised of 87 observations for the Shanghai exchange and 138
observations for the Shenzhen exchange.
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Of course, we cannot rule the possibility that causation runs in the other direction in some or many cases:
namely, that corporate disclosure of bad conduct prompted a stock exchange criticism shortly thereafter.
But given that the companies in our sample were criticized for failure to make timely disclosure of material
facts or failure to abide by related party transaction procedures (not for disclosing bad conduct alone), it
seems rather unlikely that a large number of the firms in our sample suddenly—unprompted by any
regulatory pressure—decided to disclose past bad conduct, leading ultimately to a stock exchange criticism.
81
Due to the methodology employed by the authors of this study, however, these findings are not directly
comparable to ours because their data include some public criticisms issued by the CSRC as well as the
stock exchanges and cover an earlier time period.
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For example, one study of the consequences of exchange sanctions in 2001 and 2002 found significant
market reactions to public criticisms imposed by the exchanges. Not surprisingly, the study found that the
effects were insignificant in cases where the misconduct had already been disclosed. (Dong n.d.). Another
study examined the market effects based on the type of conduct being sanctioned, finding that
misrepresentations regarding income-related information and violations relating to failure to disclose
related-party transactions or financial guarantees had the most significant effects on share price; sanctions
relating to untimely disclosure and unauthorized use of funds generated no significant market reaction.
However, the study did not distinguish between CSRC and exchange sanctions (Xue, Dong, and Guan
2004).
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For example, one study that examined sanction data from 1993 to 2001 (including both exchange and
CSRC sanctions) found significant market effects of public sanctions, but no effects of non-public
sanctions and warnings. The study also found greater effects of exchange sanctions than CSRC sanctions,
with the authors suggesting that the likely reason was prior market awareness of CSRC proceedings (Mao

effects on share price are negligible; one less rigorous study suggests that share price may
actually increase upon the issuance of an exchange sanction.84 None of the studies,
however, examines the broader potential effects of stock exchange public criticisms, as
we do below.
Before we turn to broader effects, however, we wish to address several potential
objections or qualifications to our findings. First, investors may react to a public
criticism not because of concern about the quality of the company’s public disclosures or
corporate governance practices, but because they believe a sanction signals that a
company has fallen out of political favor. Put differently, investors may believe that a
stock exchange criticism is a statement that a company lacks sufficient political leverage
to avoid punishment, and is thus unable to compete fully in China’s politically sensitive
marketplace. Implicit in this possible response to our findings is the view that the
exchanges are neither independent nor politically neutral. If this view is accurate, the
exchanges would target only small or politically unconnected companies.
The data show, however, that although the majority of sanctioned companies are
indeed private, the exchanges have also targeted some key state-owned enterprises.
Table 8 classifies sanctioned companies as either private or state-owned. Table 8
includes only those companies sanctioned for major misconduct – the same companies
used in our event study sample. For state-owned companies, the table indicates whether
the controlling shareholder (or parent thereof) was a national, provincial, or local
governmental entity. At the national and provincial level, distinctions are also drawn
between companies directly or indirectly under the National State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission and those controlled by other central
government entities. The distinction reflects the fact that shares in many of China’s most
important state-owned companies (which the exception of those in the financial services
industries, which are controlled by a separate holding company) are controlled by the
Assets Commission. The Assets Commission holds controlling stakes in 158 key central
companies; through these holdings it directly or indirectly oversees 165 publicly listed

and Wu n.d.). Another early study of exchange and CSRC sanctions using event study methodology
likewise found that exchange sanctions had more significant effects than CSRC sanctions (Wen & Yang
2002). See also Yan, Chen & Zhou (2006), who argue that exchange sanctions have a greater effect on
share price than CSRC sanctions, likely because the market is frequently aware of CSRC proceedings well
ahead of the formal announcement of a sanction; the study also found that sanctioned companies were most
likely to come from electronic and light manufacturing industries, and argued that a high rate of recidivism
suggested low deterrence value of both CSRC and exchange sanctions.
Such findings are not uniform: a study that used event study methodology to analyze CSRC and
exchange sanction data from 1999 to 2005 found that market reaction to exchange public criticisms was
weaker than that to CSRC sanctions. The study found a significant negative market reaction to both CSRC
sanctions and exchange public criticisms. The study also showed market reactions strengthening over time
(Zhang 2006).
84
One study argued that the effects of public criticism have actually weakened over time, and that the stock
prices of some companies have increased upon the company being publicly criticized. The study’s finding
were largely anecdotal, however, and the author does not appear to have used event study methodology
(Zhang 2005).

companies.85 Provincial assets commissions likewise hold shares in key provincial
company. Thus in general, companies managed by the Assets Commission are likely to
be politically more important and more influential than other state-owned companies.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
Table 8 reveals two noteworthy facts. First, private companies make up the
majority of sanctioned companies – roughly fifty-eight percent of all sanctioned
companies were private. This contrasts with the market as a whole, where the majority of
listed companies are state-owned or affiliated. Although neither the exchanges nor the
CSRC appear to provide a breakdown of the total number of companies by ownership,
officials at the exchanges estimated that state-owned companies account for
approximately sixty percent of listed companies. The greater frequency with which
private companies are sanctioned may suggest that private companies are easier targets
than state-owned companies, as they may lack the same political connections. But the
trend may also reflect lower governance standards in private companies, an opinion
voiced by many of our interviewees.
Second, although most sanctioned state-owned companies are attached to
provincial or local governments, a significant number of sanctioned companies were
major state-owned companies directly under the supervision of the Assets Commission.
Sanctioned companies included Shanghai Worldbest Pharmaceuticals, a major
pharmaceutical producer and a subsidiary of one of China’s leading industrial
conglomerates; Xinjiang Tunhe Investment Co. Ltd, China’s largest importer and
exporter of food products; Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle Co., Ltd, a key manufacturer that is
directly under central Party-state management; and China Eastern Airlines, one of
China’s three biggest airlines. Most of these companies are household names in China.
In Shenzhen, the sanctioned companies were perhaps somewhat less-well known,
but nevertheless included six attached to the State Assets Commission. These included
Shenyang Chemical Co. Ltd, a major chemical producer that is a subsidiary of one of
China’s largest chemical companies, China National Blue Star; Sinosteel Jilin Carbon
Co. Ltd., which is China’s largest carbon producer, and a subsidiary of Sinosteel, one of
China’s major steel-trading firms; and San Jiu Medical and Pharmaceutical Co. Lt, a
major pharmaceuticals company.
These data do not prove lack of political interference in the stock exchange
criticism process; indeed, as we discuss further below, political ties do seem to affect
sanction decisions in some cases. But the data show that the exchanges have in some
cases been willing to sanction influential, well known state-owned or affiliated
companies. This suggests that politics alone cannot explain the exchanges’ behavior –
and also that investors are not likely to be acting purely on a perception that sanctioned
companies have fallen out of political favor.
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For a list of companies controlled by the Assets Commission, see
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/zyqy/qyml/default.htm. For listed companies under its control, see
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/zyqy/qyml/default.htm.

Another possible interpretation of our findings is that, in a relatively inefficient
market, investors may simply be reacting uncritically to any negative attention brought to
bear on a listed firm by an organ of the state. While we cannot discount this
interpretation completely, the event study data do not appear to support this
interpretation. As Graphs 1 and 2 show, stock price reaction to both company disclosure
and stock exchange criticism over a long (20 day) period following the event suggests an
efficient market response to negative information, with stock prices falling sharply at the
event date followed by a prolonged and relatively stable period of negative cumulative
abnormal returns. If the market were reacting blindly to negative governmental attention,
stock prices could be expected to rebound quickly or move more erratically in the period
following the event.
INSERT GRAPHS 1 AND 2 HERE
3.2. Other Consequences
The limited prior work on the exchange sanctions (almost all of it in Chinese) has
focused exclusively on share price. But given market conditions and the larger political
and social context in which Chinese listed firms operate, such a focus may miss other,
possibly more salient, effects of public criticisms on firms and individuals. To gauge the
broader impact of the public criticisms (some of which are not reputational, but rather of
more direct regulatory effect), we examined the legal framework surrounding their
application, and conducted extensive interviews with potentially interested constituencies
in China, including officials at both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges, CSRC
officials, a central bank official, lawyers, bankers, and the CEO of a firm facing public
criticism by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.

3.2.1. Financing
The most direct consequence to a firm receiving a public criticism by a stock
exchange today is that its equity financing options are seriously compromised.
Regulations first adopted in 2002 and then made stricter in 2006 provide that listed
companies may not issue new publicly traded stock if the company or any of its
currently-serving directors, supervisors, or senior management has been publicly
criticized by a stock exchange in the preceding twelve months (Shangshi gongsi
zhengquan faxing guanli banfa 2006, arts. 6, 11). Similarly, a private placement of
shares is impermissible if a company’s current directors or senior managers have been
sanctioned in the prior year (Shangshi gongsi zhengquan faxing guanli banfa 2006, art.
39).86 And a company may not make an initial public offering of shares if any of its
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Private placements are barred if current directors or senior management have been sanctioned by the
CSRC within the past three years. The rules do not appear explicitly to ban a company from selling shares
through a private placement if the company or its supervisors, or any directors or senior officers who have
already been removed from office, have been sanctioned. The rules thus could be read to permit a private
offering where only the company or supervisors has been publicly criticized or where directors have been
supervised but removed from office. The rules thus suggest that looser rules apply for private placements
than for public offerings, and may reflect CSRC policy of encouraging private offerings.

directors, supervisors, or senior managers has been subject to a public criticism from a
stock exchange within the preceding year (Shouci gongkai faxing gupiao bing shangshi
guanli banfa 2006, art. 32).87 One exchange official referred to the effect of these rules
barring share offerings as “huge.”88
The severe consequences of public criticisms for companies contemplating new
share issuances provide the exchanges with significant influence. Thus, for example, the
exchanges may use the threat of a sanction to force a company to disclose certain
information or to take other actions that may be unrelated to their disclosure
obligations.89 The vagueness of the listing rules gives the exchanges particular leverage
over listed companies, as there is a wide range of possible interpretations of companies’
disclosure obligations.90
Exchange criticisms can also affect a company’s ability to obtain bank loans or
issue commercial paper.91 The exchanges make information regarding companies that
are subject to public criticism available to the Peoples’ Bank of China (PBOC), to ensure
that banks are aware that companies have encountered problems.92 As a result, public
criticism of listed companies may affect the terms of loans the companies obtain – in
particular when the criticized conduct is serious.93 In addition, regulations issued by the
PBOC provide that firms may not issue commercial paper if they have committed a
serious violation of law or regulation within the preceding three years (Duanqi
Rongziquan guanli banfa 2005, art. 10). Although the regulations do not expressly
provide that a stock exchange criticism constitutes a serious violation, central bank
officials are said to hold that interpretation. The exchanges are now working with
officials in the banking sector to create a credit reporting system, which will include data
on stock exchange criticisms.94 Exchange officials state that they view attempts by banks
and others to use public criticisms for their own purposes to be a positive development.95
Exchange officials note that banks’ reliance on exchange sanctions expands the influence
of the exchanges and their sanctions.96
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In the case of individuals sanctioned by the CSRC, the specified period is three years. Rules that were in
force between 2002 and 2006 likewise stated that listed companies seeking to issue new shares could not do
so if they or any director had been subject to a public criticism by a stock exchange within the prior twelve
months (Guanyu shangshi gongsi zengfa xingu youguan tiaojian de tongzhi 2002). The rules did not
appear to cover public criticisms against supervisors or senior management. Similar restrictions applied if
the company or directors had been punished by the CSRC in the prior year.
Rules in place beginning in 2001 likewise stated that, in deciding whether to authorize a company
to issue new shares, the CSRC should give “substantial consideration” to whether the company had been
sanctioned by an exchange or by the CSRC within the past year.
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Interview 2007-6; see also Interview 2006-69 (noting the importance of the rules).
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One lawyer recounted how the Shenzhen exchange had used the threat of a public criticism for unrelated
conduct to push a company to complete its corporate restructuring more quickly. Interview 2007-34.
90
Interview 2007-34.
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Interview 2006-1; Interview 2007-5.
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Interview 2006-68.
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Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-72.
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Interview 2006-1M; Interview 2007-5.
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Interview 2007-1.
96
Interview 2007-5.

3.2.2. Regulatory Consequences for Individuals
A variety of collateral consequences befall individuals who have been criticized
by the stock exchanges. Publicly criticized directors may in practice, if not formally, be
forced to resign, in particular for companies listed in Shenzhen. According to various
regulations promulgated by the exchanges and the CSRC, listed companies in China are
required to have independent directors (Clark 2006, p. 177). Shenzhen Stock Exchange
rules governing independent directors state that during the mandatory review of directors
prior to their election, the exchange will “emphasize” whether an independent director
has been subject to either a public criticism or a notice and criticism from an exchange or
an administrative sanction from the CSRC within the prior three years (Duli dongshi
beian banfa 2005, art. 3).97 The rules also state that when an individual is nominated to
serve as an independent director, such nomination must state whether the individual has
been subject to any such punishments within the prior three years. Although the rules do
not specifically bar individuals who have been criticized or sanctioned from serving, in
practice the rules have such an effect.98 Independent directors who are named in a public
criticism cannot be reappointed as independent directors – at the company that is being
sanctioned or elsewhere.99
Criticisms may also affect compensation of criticized individuals. CSRC
regulations governing listed companies’ share incentive plans state that no individual
who has been subject to a public criticism by an exchange within three years may be
included as beneficiary of such a plan (Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuan Hui
Guanyu Fabu “Shangshi gongsi guquan jili guanli banfa” (shixing) de tongzhi 2005).
Similarly, Shenzhen SMEB regulations state that companies must withhold or retract any
bonus payments or allowances made to company officials who are subject to public
criticisms (Shenzhen Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Zhongxiao qiyeban touzizhe quanyi baohu
zhiyin 2006, art. 43). 100
Exchange criticisms may affect other market participants as well, in particular
employees of underwriters and securities fund companies. CSRC provisions impose bans
on employees of underwriters if they or the issuers they are serving are subject to public
97

Rules governing the Shenzhen SMEB also state that the chairman of a company’s board of directors
should resign if the company (not the individual) is subject to an administrative penalty from the CSRC or
a public criticism from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the violation is “serious” (Shenzhen Zhengquan
Jiaoyisuo Zhongxiao Chuangye Bankuai shangshi gongsi dongshi xingwei zhiyin 2005, art. 29). The
regulations state that the chairman shall personally apologize to shareholders, and in serious circumstances
resign. Similarly, article 41 of the regulations state that an individual who has been subject to two or more
exchange public criticisms or three or more exchange internal criticisms within a three year period will be
deemed to be unsuitable to serve as a director for companies listed on the SMEB. Similar provisions apply
if the individual has been criticized by the CSRC twice within three years.
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Shanghai does not appear to have similar rules.
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Interview 2007-1. Exchange officials state that it is somewhat rare for directors at one company to serve
as directors elsewhere, although some independent directors serve at multiple companies.
100
Similar provisions do not appear to apply to the primary Shenzhen board or on the Shanghai Exchange.
The Shenzhen Investors Rights guidance also requires companies to disclose in the form of an “investors
risk disclosure” serious cases of internal or public criticism, or determinations of unfitness to serve against
company directors (art. 51).

criticisms. Provisions regarding sponsors of securities offerings impose a three month
ban on individuals serving as sponsors, if they or the issuers they are serving as sponsors
are subject to a public criticism during the due diligence period prior to a public offering
or a supervision period after the public offering (CSRC, Zhengquan faxing shangshi
baocun zhidu zhanxing banfa 2003). Sponsoring institutes (generally underwriters) must
replace criticized individuals serving as sponsors if they wish to proceed with an offering.
CSRC regulations likewise state that the exchanges may recommend that senior
managers of securities fund companies be removed from office if they have been subject
to an exchange sanction within the past twelve months (CSRC, Zhengquan touzi jijin
hangye gaoji guanli renyuan renzhi guanli banfa 2004).

3.2.3. Reputational Effects
Companies and individuals fear stock exchange sanctions for another important
reason: reputational effects. Companies are required to disclose both the fact that they
have been subject to criticism from a stock exchange and the reasons for such criticism in
their annual report (Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui guanyu yinfa
“gongkai faxing zhengquan de gongsi xinxi pilu neirong yu geshi zhunze di 2 hao niandu
baogao de neirong yu geshi” (2005 nian xiuding) de tongzhi 2005).101 Moreover, the fact
that a company or individual has been publicly criticized is virtually always reported in
the Chinese media. Criticisms can also result in the exchanges taking steps to designate a
company’s stock as high risk. In Shenzhen, the direct effects appear clearer than in
Shanghai. Both exchanges rate the quality of a company’s information disclosure, and a
sanction generally correlates with a low or non-passing rating from the exchanges. For
Shenzhen such ratings are made public and posted on the exchange’s website; in
Shanghai the reports are apparently not made public. Although being sanctioned does not
automatically lead to a listed company being designated as high-risk by the exchanges,
Shenzhen officials state that multiple sanctions can contribute to such a designation.102
The reputational effects of a sanction may be even more significant than the
inability of a company to raise new funds. This may be particularly the case in China,
where both individual career prospects and corporate performance may depend heavily
on reputation.103 All market participants we interviewed for this study agreed that
exchange sanctions will have a serious impact on companies’ and individuals’
reputations. One exchange official commented that criticism will result in “lots of
pressure” on both the companies and individuals who are criticized.104 A lawyer
remarked that being sanctioned will affect investors’ trust in a company, particularly
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The 2005 notice is the most recent notice governing the content and format of annual reports. Similar
provisions regarding disclosure of exchange Public Criticisms existed in notices that applied in prior years,
and are also included in the CSRC’s notice governing semi-annual reports.
Although companies subject to exchange criticisms are required to disclose the fact of the
criticisms, they are not generally required to apologize. Interview 2006-7. In two cases in our sample,
however, the Shenzhen Exchange ordered sanctioned companies to issue public apologies to stockholders.
Both sanctions were issued in 2002.
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Interview 2007-5.
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For an extended discussion of reputation rights of companies and individuals, see Liebman (2006).
104
Interview 2206-63.

given that the market is moved by rumor.105 Some noted the official role of the
exchanges means that exchange sanctions will send a clear message to investors that a
company’s problems are severe. As the lawyer explained, “Investors will think that
[misconduct] is no big deal unless the government cares.”106 Once the exchanges act,
however, the companies will suffer negative effects.
Yet the most significant consequences on companies’ reputations are more
difficult to quantify. Lawyers say that companies do not want to be known as having
problems.107 Exchange officials say that being criticized will affect “companies’ trust in
society” as well as the jobs of corporate officials.108 Likewise, weakened corporate
reputations may affect their ability to earn profit.109 For state-owned companies,
exchange sanctions may have indirect political consequences on companies as well as
managers, directors, and supervisors. Being criticized may affect companies’
relationships with state entities that control the company – and that designate senior
company management. Similarly, an exchange criticism may impede a company’s
ability to engage in mergers or reorganizations. Although the consequences of being
subject to criticism by an exchange appear far less serious than those of being sanctioned
by the CSRC, companies nevertheless fear any official exposure of wrongdoing.
The consequences for non-state companies may be even more significant. The
CEO of a non-state company listed in Shenzhen that had been informed of the Shenzhen
exchange’s intention to issue a public criticism, explained the potential consequences of
being publicly shamed.110 The executive explained that the company is trying to be
known as a high quality company; receiving a public criticism “will cause problems.”111
Being sanctioned would affect the company’s ability to raise additional capital, its
relationship with banks, and its ability to engage in restructuring and mergers. It will also
affect the company’s standing with investors. The CEO argued that few investors pay
attention to corporate disclosure, but they will take note that a company has been subject
to an official sanction. The CEO noted that the company was not state-owned. If stateowned companies encounter problems, the executive argued, banks and the local
government will work with the company to address the problems; private companies do
not enjoy the same protections.112
The CEO also contended that the Shenzhen Exchanges’ more aggressive strategy
in recent years may create disincentives to provide accurate disclosure. The CEO
acknowledged that the company had engaged in misconduct by failing to disclose certain
loan guarantees, but noted that the problems occurred in the past, before the current
management team took over. Indeed, the problems were disclosed by the new
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Interview 2007-34.
Interview 2007-34.
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Interview 2006-71.
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Interview 2006-72.
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Interview 2006-72.
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The company was, at the time, also being investigated by the CSRC. Interview 2007-29.
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Interview 2007-29.
112
Interview 2007-29. In the case of individuals, however, the consequences for managers and directors of
state-owned companies appear to be as or more severe. See infra.
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management: “We tried hard to reveal [the past problems]. Now they will sanction us.
This is not fair.”113 Were they to be punished, the executive argued, it would send a
message to other companies that they will be sanctioned for fully complying with
disclosure obligations regarding past misconduct: “If [the exchange] punishes us, others
will be encouraged to cover-up.”114 The executive conceded that an internal sanction was
appropriate, but argued that publicly shaming the company would achieve little.115
China’s markets are maturing, said the CEO, but the exchanges should not move too far
ahead of the market in its enforcement strategy.116 The company has made major
improvements in recent years, and should be encouraged rather than punished. Echoing
current central government concern with social stability, the CEO noted that there was a
potential risk to the state if the exchanges were too aggressive: the company has
hundreds of workers, whose livelihoods could be affected if the company’s business
suffers as a result of being subject to a public criticism.117
The CEO’s assessment that the consequences of exchange sanctions have become
more significant in recent years is shared by exchange officials. Exchange officials note
that in the past, companies paid little regard to the possibility of being sanctioned – with
some saying that they did not care if they were sanctioned. In contrast, today, companies
take extensive steps to try to avoid sanctions.118 Nevertheless, not all companies give the
threat of sanctions the same emphasis. One lawyer commented that companies who have
strong reputations will treat the threat of being criticized very seriously; companies that
are already encountering difficulties may be less concerned.119 Likewise, exchange
officials state that some companies continue to disregard the threat of exchange
sanctions.120
As with sanctions on companies, the most significant effects on individuals may
be intangible. Officials, lawyers, and corporate officials all stated that the consequences
of a public criticism on an individual’s reputation can be severe. Corporate officers and
independent directors frequently attempt to persuade the exchanges to sanction only the
company, not them individually.121 Many argue either that they were unaware of the
conduct, or had no choice but to acquiesce because they were assigned to serve as a
director by the company’s controlling shareholder.122 Many independent directors are
academics or well known people who fear that the criticisms will harm their public
standing.
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Interview 2007-5. Exchange officials comment that many such directors appear to have virtually no
prior awareness of their legal obligations as directors.
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The effects on non-independent directors’ reputations can also be severe. Nonindependent directors likewise may fear that being sanctioned may affect their ability to
obtain employment in the future.123 Executives at state-owned companies are generally
appointed by the government department that oversees the company. Their next position
thus frequently is within government: as one lawyer observed, someone who is a CEO of
a state-owned company today may be appointed governor of a province next year.124
Being sanctioned may affect executives’ career path within the Party-state system.125
The CEO of the non-state company facing a possible sanction explained the possible
effects of a public criticism: “It will harm my reputation; this looks very bad.”126
Although none of the existing directors were at the company at the time the misconduct
occurred, the exchange had listed the current directors as potential targets of a sanction.
The executive noted that a criticism of an individual would harm that person’s ability to
obtain a position at another company. Prospective employers will see only that the
individual has been sanctioned, rather than inquiring whether the misconduct occurred on
the individual’s watch.

4. EVALUATION

We began the paper by noting several strands of literature related to our research
on stock exchange criticisms. In this final section, we examine the contributions of our
research to these separate literatures. We begin by assessing the benefits and costs of this
form of regulation in the contemporary Chinese context.
The most obvious advantage of shaming sanctions is low cost enforcement.
Shaming works as a punishment and a deterrent because reputations are valuable assets,
and shaming injures reputation (Kahan and Posner 1999). Our qualitative empirical
assessment of public criticisms strongly suggests that both corporate and individual
reputations matter in China, and that firms and individuals fight to stave off criticism
from the stock exchanges. We have also presented evidence that other parties shun (or
raise their price for dealing with) firms and individuals that have been publicly criticized
by the exchanges. These findings suggest that public criticisms are doing some work in
punishing and deterring improper corporate conduct by listed firms in China, though we
cannot make any definite claims about the extent to which this is true. The criticisms
thus provide a comparatively low cost regulatory tool.
Shaming sanctions may be more effective where the surrounding institutional
environment is comparatively devoid of alternative deterrence and punishment
mechanisms. Certainly that describes the current situation in China, where, as we have
seen, the stock market is not yet supported by a robust network of enforcement
institutions. The primary market regulator, the CSRC, is well intentioned and perhaps as
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aggressive as it can be given its resource constraints and limited political breathing room.
But it is ill-equipped to serve as the sole monitor of the capital markets. Shareholder
litigation, which in the United States serves as a crucial complement to SEC oversight, is
simply not yet a viable means of investor protection in China. Other potential actors,
such as active institutional investors, civil society organizations, and a free financial
press, are also either missing or at a nascent stage of development. In such an
environment, the stock exchange criticisms appear to be an important part of China’s
current regulatory regime. Perhaps their role will fade as surrounding institutions
develop greater capacity, but currently they seem to be gaining in importance in the
regulatory regime.
We do not claim that shaming is necessarily more effective in China than
elsewhere. But reputational sanctions may have particular force in China given both the
underdeveloped status of China’s legal institutions, and the strong emphasis on reputation
evident in Chinese society today (Liebman 2006). The use and effectiveness of shaming
sanctions is also not surprising given China’s legal history. Shaming played an important
role in China’s imperial legal system, most notably in the wearing of the cangue, and in
the Chinese legal system prior to the reform era. Shaming as a mechanism of political
and social governance played a major role during the Cultural Revolution, suggesting
perhaps some type of cultural or social affinity for this tool of public ordering, at least
among those in positions of authority. Indeed, one explanation for why Chinese law
provides robust protection for reputation rights today – in particular when contrasted with
other forms of individual rights – is a desire to avoid to the reputation-based attacks of
the Cultural Revolution.
Might the recent experience of exchange sanctions hold lessons for other areas
where under-enforcement of law remains a problem? We are wary of declaring
reputational sanctions to have extensive application outside the corporate governance
context. The recent use of shaming sanctions by the Chinese police against prostitutes in
Shenzhen touched off widespread outrage and condemnation within China, reflecting
how far China has come from the pre-reform era (Magnier 2006). But our findings are
also consistent with the view, set forth by one of us elsewhere, that public exposure may
be the single most effective tool for combating wrongdoing in China today (Liebman
2005). Some of the institutional characteristics of China’s stock exchanges are unique.
For example, the exchanges do not have close political ties to the companies they
oversee, and most of the companies that they oversee are not from their local
jurisdictions. Local protectionism thus appears to be a far less significant factor than it is
in many areas in which China suffers from under-enforcement of laws and regulations.
Nevertheless, even in areas where local protectionism is a major problem, including
perhaps most notably environmental law, there may be lessons from the experiences of
China’s stock exchanges: limited devolution of power to relatively autonomous
institutions may have a significant effect. And targeting the reputations of wrongdoers
may be more practical, and more effective, than more complicated or cumbersome
enforcement actions which rely upon a host of complementary enforcement institutions.

China’s stock market development to date provides important comparative
evidence in support of the literature on stock exchanges as providers of investor
protection. Of course, the Chinese context is distinctive and cannot be squarely equated
with the historical experience of the United States or the U.K. which inspired this
literature. But within the distinctive constraints of contemporary Chinese institutions and
politics, stock exchange criticisms appear to be an innovative and proactive experiment in
investor protection to raise the quality and stature of the stock market. The experience of
the Shenzhen Exchange in particular highlights the role of self-interest as a motivation to
provide investor protection. In order to compete effectively, exchanges must be
concerned about the governance practices of listed companies and the quality of the
information disclosure regime. This motivation holds even where, as in China, the
exchanges are extensions of the state rather than private membership organizations. The
London and Hong Kong Stock Exchange pioneered the use of public criticisms as a
regulatory device to improve investor protection. Acting on similar motivation, mainland
Chinese stock exchanges appear to have effectively transplanted this regulatory technique
into a more state-centered market system.
The benefits of the stock exchange criticisms as deployed in China, however,
appear to extend beyond investor protection. We find particularly intriguing the fact that
other regulators and market actors are beginning to piggyback on the stock exchange
criticisms. As shown above, the CSRC now ties capital raising and independent director
criteria to the stock exchange sanctions. The central bank is making use of the
information produced by the stock exchanges in building a national credit rating system.
Available evidence suggests banks already take account of the criticisms in their loan
decisions at some level. And somewhat more speculatively, prosecutors and political
actors appear to use the sanctions as a signaling device to identify “bad actors” whose
conduct requires special scrutiny. In this way, the stock exchange criticisms have
become a focal point for further regulatory development and market policing.
Cooperative interactions among governmental and market actors are expanding the scope
and impact of the stock exchange criticisms.
Our study also offers a perspective on the small body of literature discussing the
role of the media in corporate governance. The principal conclusion of this literature,
which focuses exclusively on investor reaction, is that international media exposure can
be a useful corrective to corporate governance problems, particularly in a transition
economy such as Russia, by amplifying the reputational cost of misbehavior (Dyck,
Volchova and Zingales 2006). Our study of the Chinese situation both supports and
departs from this conclusion. Clearly the sanctions gain force through publication in the
media. Indeed, the interaction between the stock exchanges and the media seems crucial
to the functioning of this system of punishment and deterrence. Here too, we see
collaboration among separate institutions as a means of creating a novel form of informal
regulation. The stock exchanges use the media to publicize the sanctions, and media
coverage increases the reputational effect on the offender (Dyck and Zingales 2002;
Dyck, Volchova and Zingales 2006). However, in China, it is domestic, not
international, media coverage that matters. We are unaware of any reference, let alone
coverage, of Chinese stock exchange criticisms in the international media. Also note that

the reputational impact of the criticisms (and media coverage thereof) extends well
beyond the investing public, to encompass other regulators, banks, government officials,
and prospective employees of corporate management.
At first glimpse the important role of China’s non-free media in corporate
governance issues might appear counterintuitive. In practice, however, the Chinese
media enjoy significantly more autonomy in reporting on financial misconduct than they
do reporting on most other areas of Chinese law and society. China’s leadership has
clearly recognized the valuable role the media can play in curbing corporate misdeeds –
even as they continue to limit the media’s ability to report on many other areas. And the
Chinese media remain arms of the Chinese Party-state: there are virtually no privately
owned media outlets in China. The Chinese media’s long history of serving as both state
mouthpiece and as an important intelligence gathering institution for Party-state leaders
results in media whose reports are often particularly influential (Liebman 2005).
Public criticisms, like any other form of regulation, have costs and limitations. As
Dan Kahan and Eric Posner have noted, there is no reason to believe that the level of
deterrence provided by shaming sanctions is optimal, because the reputational injury to
the offender depends on highly idiosyncratic variables that are not fully known to the
government (in our case, the exchange) when it imposes the penalty (Kahan and Posner
1999, pp. 373-373). Plainly, the level of deterrence provided by the stock exchange
criticisms has been insufficient to deter significant levels of bad conduct in the Chinese
stock market. Moreover, though the criticisms may be a relatively cheap form of
enforcement for the government, they may be costly to society. This is particularly true
if the stock exchanges impose criticisms erroneously or for motives unconnected to
investor protection. We have no evidence that this occurs, but the procedural vagueness
surrounding the sanction decisions and the lack of a formal appeal mechanism are
certainly cause for concern. Even where criticisms of listed firms are 100% accurate and
well intentioned, shaming a corporation can adversely affect the reputations of
individuals who were not involved in the wrongdoing.
While we cannot provide a definitive assessment of the contributions of stock
exchange criticisms to China’s capital market development, our study does provide one
of the most concrete examples available of a phenomenon other scholars (Allen, Qian and
Qian 2005) have argued is key to China’s economic growth in the absence of robust legal
institutions—reputational mechanisms to support market activity. In the case of China’s
securities market, the threat of reputational sanctions appears to provide the exchanges
with significant leverage to achieve the primary goal of any securities regulatory
regime—namely, corporate disclosure of material information. Moreover, the purely
reputational effects of the sanctions are buttressed by formal rules restricting the
financing ability of firms subject to public criticism. Whatever its shortcomings, this
scheme of regulation appears to be simultaneously providing a measure of investor
protection and serving as the basis for more formal regulatory efforts to bolster the
quality of information relevant to equity and bank finance.

Our analysis also highlights parallels with other reforms at the edges of the legal
system. As one of us has pointed out in a different context, the Chinese legal system
contains space for innovation by a range of actors (Liebman 2006, pp. 107-108).
Experimentation and devolution of lawmaking or law enforcement activity are common
to legal reforms across a range of substantive and institutional areas in China. In the case
of stock market regulation, we see a modest devolution of authority and the creation of
multiple, overlapping lines of regulatory authority. Hence we see explicit and implicit
devolution of authority by the CSRC to the exchanges. In a system where rival interests
and institutional capacity may make it hard for CSRC to play a greater oversight role,
devolution is becoming an effective tool.
Yet the recent experience in China’s securities market may be particularly
noteworthy because although experimentation and devolution in lawmaking and in
economic policymaking are common in China, devolution of enforcement powers has
been less successful. Local protectionism is perhaps the single biggest problem
undermining China’s efforts to strengthen its legal system, and the combination of
devolved authority and local protectionism frequently leads to under-enforcement. In the
case of exchange sanctions, however, devolved authority is contributing to more effective
oversight – in part because of the absence of local protectionism (or perhaps more
accurately, because the local incentives operating on the exchanges favor stronger, rather
than weaker, enforcement), and in part because the exchanges have relied on reputational
sanctions, rather than more formal punishments. The exchanges’ institutional interests in
expanding their own authority and influence have played an important role in such
developments. Modest forms of regulatory competition are also emerging between the
two exchanges, and may likewise be providing incentives to the exchanges to expand
their influence.

CONCLUSION

We have examined China’s legal and self-regulatory strategies for capital market
development. Although progress to date is mixed, we have uncovered a feature of
Chinese securities regulation that has thus far received almost no attention: the role of
reputational sanctions imposed by the stock exchanges as a mechanism of punishment
and deterrence in the capital market. Although this regulatory mechanism may take a
rather unorthodox form, our empirical evidence and interview results strongly suggest
that the market is punishing bad conduct. The broader lessons from this novel
experiment for the securities law and for Chinese law more generally, may not be known
for years. But one conclusion is clear: new forms of governance are being created in the
interstices of what we normally perceive of as a clear dichotomy between state and
private regulation of the securities markets. China’s institution-building exercise in the
area of capital markets is worth understanding at a deep level of institutional detail. This
article has been a first step in that direction.
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Table 1
WORLD RANKINGS OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION, VALUE TRADED, AND NUMBER OF LISTED DOMESTIC COMPANIES, 2005
Rank

Market

1

United States

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Japan
United Kingdom
France
Canada
Germany
Hong Kong
Spain
Switzerland
Australia
Italy
China

Total Market Capitalization Rank
(US$ millions)
16,997,982
1
4,736,513
3,058,182
1,710,029
1,480,891
1,221,250
1,006,228
960,024
938,624
804,074
798,167
780,763

Source: S&P Global Stock Market Factbook (2006)

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Market
United States
Japan
United Kingdom
Germany
Spain
France
Korea
Italy
Saudi Arabia
Switzerland
Canada
Netherlands
Taiwan
Australia
China

Total Value Traded
(US$ millions)
21,509,979
4,997,414
4,167,020
1,763,155
1,557,246
1,475,537
1,202,976
1,115,224
1,103,502
883,270
845,017
757,437
618,207
616,115
586,301

Rank

Market

1

United States

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

India
Romania
Canada
Spain
Japan
United Kingdom
Korea
Australia
China

Number of Listed
Domestic Companies
5,143
4,763
3,747
3,271
3,300
3,279
2,759
1,643
1,620
1,387

Table 2
COMPARISON OF EXTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS (MEAN)
Country

English French
origin
origin
average average
External capital/GNP 0.60
0.21
Domestic firms/Pop
35.45
10.00
IPOs/Population
2.23
0.19
Total debt/GNP
0.68
0.45

German
origin
average
0.46
16.79
0.12
0.97

Scandinavian
origin
average
0.30
27.26
2.14
0.57

LLSV
origin
average
0.40
21.59
1.02
0.59

China
(2002)
0.49 (0.16)*
0.93
0.05
0.35 (0.79)**

Source: Adapted from Allen et. al. (2005)
*External capital/GNP ratio using the floating supply or value traded portion of the market
capitalization.
**Total debt/GNP ratio using bank loans issued to all sectors including the state sector.

Table 3
CSRC SANCTIONS, 2001-2006
Total Number of Sanction Decisions
Sanctions Directed against Entities or Entities and
Individuals
Sanctions Directed against Individuals Only
Total Number of Companies Sanctioned
Listed Companies
Securities Entities (includes Securities Companies
and subsidiary organizations)
Law Firms
Accounting Firms
Asset Appraisal Firms
Other types of companies
Total Number of Individuals Sanctioned
Company Directors
Company Non-Director Employees*
Company Supervisors
Securities Industry Employees
Certified Public Accountants
Lawyers
Certified Public Values
Others
Cases Involving Information Disclosure

29

2001
17

2002
35

2003
49

2004
43

2005
2006

24
5
24
8

13
4
13
5

33
2
33
17

39
10
39
26

38
5
38
14

25
18
7
18

9
0
4
0
3
115
79
1
0
16
16
0
0
3
8

3
0
4
0
1
70
53
3
0
4
9
1
0
0
6**

7
0
4
0
5
147
130
4
0
4
9
0
0
0
17

3
0
4
1
5
283
241
7
1
20
12
0
2
0
27**

20
0
2
0
2
154
117
10
0
20
7
0
0
0
15**

13
3
0
1
0
1
101
69
6
0
15
4
0
0
7

Source: CSRC web site
NOTE: One case from 2001 appears to be missing from the website and thus is not included in the
table.
* Typically a chief accountant or financial supervisor.
** One case included in the total is a sanction against an individual only, not the company.

Table 4
NUMBER OF PUBLIC CRITICISMS OF LISTED COMPANIES BY STOCK EXCHANGES,
2001-2006127
Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total

Shanghai Stock Exchange
16 (646)
16 (715)
19 (780)
21 (837)
18 (834)
19 (840)
109

Shenzhen Stock Exchange
32 (514)
21 (509)
17 (507)
18 (540)
33 (544)
28 (533)
149

Source: Stock Exchange Public Criticisms
( ) indicates number of listed companies as of December 31128

127

The data include all publicly available exchange-issued public criticisms. It is possible that a small
number of additional public criticisms were issued but not listed on the exchange’s website.
128
Numbers of listed companies are from the websites of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.

Table 5

NUMBER OF CRITICISMS OF INDIVIDUALS, 2001-2006

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total

Shanghai Stock Exchange
11
156
173
134
159
149
782

Source: Stock Exchange Public Criticisms

Shenzhen Stock Exchange
105
28
110
101
256
276
876

Table 6

POSITION OF CRITICIZED INDIVIDUALS
Position of Sanctioned
Individual
Executive Director
Independent Director
Board Secretary
Supervisor
Chief Accountant/CFO
Other Management

Shanghai Stock Exchange

Shenzhen Stock Exchange

645
25
11
91
4
6

735
40
7
64
3
27

Source: Stock Exchange Public Criticisms

Table 7

STOCK PRICE REACTION TO CRITICISMS AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
# of
Observations
Public Criticism
68
SHSE
Public Criticism
98
SZSE
Company
90
Disclosure
SHSE
Company
140
Disclosure
SZSE
** Significant at 0.05 level
*** Significant at 0.01 level

CAR 3day

CAR 5day

-0.0207

Z-value
(CAR 3day)
-3.68***

-0.0272

Z-value
(CAR 5day)
-3.75***

-0.0096

-2.05**

-0.0058

-0.96

-0.0368

-7.59***

-0.0421

-6.72***

-0.0364

-9.40***

-0.0396

-7.93***

Table 8
COMPANIES SANCTION FOR MAJOR MISCONDUCT BY STATE-AFFILIATION129
Actual Controlling Entity
State-Owned Companies
National State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration
Commission
Other Central Government
Departments and Commissions
Provincial State-Owned Assets
Management Authorities
Provincial governments
Other (lower-ranking governments)
State-Owned Companies Total
Private Companies
Total

Number of Sanctioned
Companies -Shenzhen

Number of Sanctioned
Companies -Shanghai

Total

6

6

12

2

6

8

15

9

24

2
22

1
12

3
34

47
70
117

34
43
77

81
113
194

Source: Calculations based on company annual reports

129

Sanctions for minor misconduct – most often failure to file timely reports – have been excluded.
Information on ownership was obtained from review of company annual reports.
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Graph 2
STOCK PRICE REACTION TO STOCK EXCHANGE CRITICISMS
SHSZ Public Criticism
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